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ABSTRACT 
Courts and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division have 
become increasingly tolerant of patent licensing practices that 
were previously viewed with suspicion.  This trend has put pressure 
on the doctrine of patent misuse, which arose in the 1940s as a 
doctrine distinct from, but closely related to, standard antitrust 
analysis.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
recently overturned an International Trade Commission order that 
held unenforceable, on the grounds of patent misuse, six patents 
licensed as a package by U.S. Philips Corporation.  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision raises the question of just how much remains of 
the doctrine of patent misuse. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission,2 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit revisited the issue of patent misuse 
in the context of patent pool licensing.3  Based on a complaint filed by U.S. 
Philips Corporation (Philips), the United States International Trade 
Commission (Commission) had investigated nineteen companies, all of 
which were ultimately accused of illegally importing compact discs (CDs) 
that infringed six of Philips’ patents.4 An administrative law judge found 
that the six patents were indeed infringed, but that the patents were 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; M.B.A., Duke 
University Fuqua School of Business; M.S. in Electrical Engineering, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University; B.E. in Electrical Engineering, 
Georgia Institute of Technology.   
2 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
3 See id. at 1182.  The term patent pool refers to a variety of arrangements 
whereby multiple patents are licensed as a package (or “portfolio”).  Often, 
several companies consolidate their technologically related patents into an 
independent entity for licensing to others.  See Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of 
Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611-14 (1984); 
Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. 
ON REG. 359, 367-72 (1999).  
4 Philips, 424 F.3d at 1182-83. 
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unenforceable “by reason of patent misuse.”5  On review, the Commission 
upheld the administrative judge’s ruling, confirming that Philips’ licensing 
program “constitute[d] patent misuse per se as a tying arrangement between 
(1) licenses to patents that are essential to manufacture [CDs] . . . and (2) 
licenses to other patents that are not essential to that activity.”6  Perhaps 
anticipating that the Federal Circuit might disagree with its per se holding, 
the Commission also analyzed the issue under the rule of reason standard 
and held that the Philips program likewise constituted patent misuse under 
the rule of reason.7  
¶2 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed both holdings, ruling that 
neither per se patent misuse nor patent misuse under the rule of reason was 
demonstrated.8   But in doing so, the court’s opinion raises serious 
questions about the continued viability of the doctrine of patent misuse.  
Are there any patent licensing practices today, other than the most egregious 
instances of product tying, that will constitute per se patent misuse?  Does 
the court’s opinion signal that the long-observed practice of excluding so-
called non-essential patents from patent pools is unnecessary, and thus 
undermine a key premise of the Justice Department’s approach to patent 
licensing practices? 
¶3 Part I of this iBrief details the early treatment of patent licensing 
schemes and then traces the history of the doctrine of patent misuse, 
beginning shortly after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act9 in 1890 
and continuing through the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the doctrine in the 
1980s.  Part II addresses whether inclusion of a non-essential patent in a 
package license, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, constitutes patent 
misuse, beginning with a description of the Justice Department’s recent 
views towards patent pools and continuing with a summary of the Philips 
decision.  Following a brief criticism of the Federal Circuit’s economic 
analysis in Philips, this iBrief concludes that at a minimum, the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion suggests that the concept of per se patent misuse is 
                                                     
5 Id. at 1183. 
6 Id. (quoting Int’l Trade Comm’n, Commission Opinion, In re Certain 
Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, 
at 4 (served Apr. 8, 2004) (public version)). 
7 Id. at 1184.  The Commission and the Federal Circuit each used the terms 
“patent misuse per se” and “patent misuse under the rule of reason.”  Id.  The 
latter usage especially reflects the decline of the doctrine of patent misuse as a 
doctrine distinct from general antitrust analysis.  As shown below, the doctrine 
of patent misuse was originally employed to render patents unenforceable 
without any showing of actual anticompetitive effect, thus patent misuse was 
necessarily “per se.”  See infra notes 56-59, and accompanying text.   
8 Philips, 424 F.3d at 1197-98. 
9 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2000)). 
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essentially obsolete.  Viewed more expansively, the opinion may suggest 
that carefully excluding non-essential patents from patent pool licenses is no 
longer necessary. 
I. THE HISTORY OF PATENT MISUSE 
A. Patent Licensing Before the Patent Misuse Doctrine: From the 
Sherman Act to Standard Oil 
¶4 For the first twenty years after passage of the Sherman Act, antitrust 
law appeared to have little applicability to patent licensing.10  Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Bement v. National Harrow Co.: 
[T]he general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under 
the patent laws of the United States.  The very object of these laws is 
monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions 
which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of 
property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the 
right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the 
courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the 
monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.11
Encouraged by National Harrow, at least one appellate court declared that 
patented items fell completely outside the scope of the Sherman Act, since, 
in its view, “patented articles, unless or until they are released by the owner 
of the patent from the dominion of his monopoly, are not articles of trade or 
commerce among the several states.”12  Acknowledging the “evils to be 
remedied by the Sherman [Act],”13 the court nevertheless upheld the 
validity of a licensing scheme that fixed minimum prices and assigned 
maximum sales quotas to each of the eighteen licensees.14
                                                     
10 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 373. 
11 Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902).  The National Harrow 
Company was formed by six companies holding various patents for “float-spring 
tooth harrows,” id. at 77, and held the rights to eighty-five patents, id. at 70.  
This was apparently the first Supreme Court challenge to a patent pool on the 
grounds of an antitrust violation.  The license agreement included a number of 
provisions that clearly would violate the “Nine No-Nos,” see infra note 48 and 
accompanying text, including provisions explicitly fixing the selling prices for 
the licensed products and prohibiting the sale of similar products not covered by 
the licensed patents, Nat’l Harrow, 186 U.S. at 72-74.  
12 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 F. 358, 362 
(7th Cir. 1907). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 359. 
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¶5 This virtual immunity from antitrust scrutiny ended abruptly in 
1912.15  In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States,16 the 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected any notion that patent licenses were 
immune from the Sherman Act.17  Then, two decades later, the Supreme 
Court decided Standard Oil Co. v. United States,18 “the seminal case 
involving patent pooling,”19 and introduced the basic contours of the 
economic analysis that is still applied today in antitrust cases involving 
patent pools. 
¶6 The Standard Oil Court faced a complaint brought by the United 
States government alleging that a complicated array of seventy-nine 
contracts entered into by four patent holders and forty-six licensees violated 
the Sherman Act by creating “an illegal combination to create a monopoly 
and to restrain interstate commerce by controlling that part of the supply of 
gasoline which is produced by the process of cracking.”20  The Court first 
re-affirmed the applicability of the Sherman Act to patent licenses, 
declaring, “Any agreement between competitors may be illegal if part of a 
                                                     
15 Carlson, supra note 3, at 374. 
16 226 U.S. 20 (1912). 
17 See id. at 48-49 (“The added element of the patent in the case at bar cannot 
confer immunity from [condemnation under the Sherman Act]. . . .”); see also 
Carlson, supra note 3, at 374 (summarizing Standard Sanitary Mfg.).  To no 
avail, counsel for the defendant vehemently warned the Supreme Court against 
extending the Sherman Act’s coverage to patent licenses: 
Translated literally . . . the Sherman Act is a blight upon 
enterprise. The venom of anarchy could not elaborate a more 
enervating, paralyzing proscription. All business would be 
under the ban of the law; with the result that it would be left to 
the caprice or favor of the Attorney-General to give immunity 
to favorites or punish enemies. If the Sherman Act means this, 
then we make bold to say that it is the righteous duty of every 
lawyer to circumvent the Sherman Act if it can be 
accomplished.  
Standard Sanitary Mfg., 226 U.S. at 21. 
18 283 U.S. 163 (1931). 
19 Andewelt, supra note 3, at 633. 
20 Standard Oil, 283 U.S. at 165.  “Cracking,” the heating of oil under pressure, 
is a secondary process for producing gasoline, applied to the oil left over from 
the primary distillation process.  Andewelt, supra note 3, at 633.  According to 
the Court, the contracts covered fifty five percent of all cracked gasoline 
production; cracked gasoline in turn accounted for twenty six percent of all 
gasoline production.  Id. at 634.  However, whether it was possible for any 
cracked gasoline to be produced at that time without use of the patented 
processes has been questioned.  Id. at 635 (citing W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND 
ANTITRUST LAW 205-13 (1973)). 
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larger plan to control interstate markets.”21  However, the Court then 
rejected the government’s argument that proof of monopolistic intent was 
demonstrated by the fact that the license agreements provided for a division 
of royalties between the four patent holders.  The Court said that patent 
pooling arrangements might not only be beneficial, but essential, “if 
technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation.”22   
¶7  In dismissing the government’s complaint, the Standard Oil Court 
emphasized the potential positive effects of a patent pool.  If the patents 
were available “on reasonable terms to all manufacturers,” the Court 
reasoned, “such interchange may promote rather than restrain 
competition.”23  Nevertheless, “reasonable terms” did not necessarily mean 
reasonable rates.  Brushing aside the government’s claim that the licensing 
terms were “onerous,” and therefore distorted the gasoline market, the Court 
held that, absent proof that “the industry is dominated, or interstate 
commerce directly restrained,” the patent holders were entitled to their fees, 
as one of the “privileges incident to ownership of patents.”24  Here, the 
Court decided, market dominance was not proven, nor, were the fees proven 
to be excessive.25 
B. A More Skeptical Approach: Standard Oil to the Nine No-Nos  
¶8 Standard Oil appeared to establish a moderate approach towards 
antitrust analysis of patent pools.  Patent licensing agreements were not 
                                                     
21 Standard Oil, 283 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 171. 
23 Id.  See also Andewelt, supra note 3, at 634 (“The Court also stressed the 
benefits that could derive from the pool . . . .”).  Cf. United States Department of 
Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property at 4-6 (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter 1995 
Guidelines] (describing the procompetitive benefits of intellectual property 
licensing). 
24 Standard Oil, 283 U.S. at 172. 
25 Id. at 172-73.  Roger B. Andewelt, while Chief of the Intellectual Property 
Section of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, roundly criticized the 
Supreme Court’s market analysis in Standard Oil, noting that the Court 
incorrectly identified the relevant market and incorrectly assumed that a lack of 
market distortion could be determined by simply looking at the market share 
covered by the patent pool.  Andewelt, supra note 3, at 634-35.  However, as 
will be shown below, the Standard Oil Court’s recognition of the potential 
benefits flowing from patent pools emerges as a key premise underlying the 
Justice Department’s recent approach to patent pools. 
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immune from antitrust scrutiny, yet neither were they especially suspect.26  
Under the Standard Oil approach a court might refrain from questioning the 
reasonableness of royalty rates, since a royalty is but a reasonable perquisite 
of the patent grant; however, a patent pooling arrangement that excluded 
interested manufacturers would likely be viewed skeptically.27   
¶9 Over the four decades following Standard Oil, the Supreme Court 
applied antitrust analysis to a variety of patent licensing arrangements.28  
For example, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,29 the Court forced 
the members of a cartel controlling over 600 patents, covering virtually the 
entire field of glass-blowing technology,30 to license the patents to all 
comers at a reasonable royalty rate.31  In doing so, however, the Court 
reversed the lower court’s order that the patents be licensed to all comers 
royalty-free,32 expressing concern that such an order would effect a 
forfeiture of the patents:  “[T]he courts, in enjoining violations of the 
Sherman Act arising from the use of patent licenses, agreements, and leases, 
have abstained from action which amounted to a forfeiture of the patents.”33 
¶10 The Hartford-Empire Court distinguished the lower court’s 
imposition of a royalty-free compulsory license from the concept of 
unenforceability.34   The latter reflects “the doctrine that, so long as the 
patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot 
                                                     
26 Cf. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 3 (“Intellectual property is thus neither 
particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect 
under them.”). 
27 See Andewelt, supra note 3, at 638. 
28 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (glass-
blowing cartel controlling 600 patents); United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 
U.S. 319 (1947) (patent pool covering the manufacture of titanium pigments); 
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (collection of patents 
covering electrical circuit breakers); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 
174 (1963) (cross-license agreements covering sewing-machine technology).  
29 323 U.S. 386 (1945).   
30 Carlson, supra note 3, at 374-75.  Carlson quotes Justice Hugo Black: “The 
history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely 
successful economic tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished 
by these appellants.”  Id. at 374 (quoting Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 436-37 
(Black, J., dissenting in part)). 
31 See Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 417-35 (modifying the district court’s order, 
preserving pre-existing license agreements, as modified by the Court, and 
imposing restrictions on further licensing); Andewelt, supra note 3, at 636. 
32 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 620-21 (N.D. Ohio 
1942), modified, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).  See also Andewelt, supra note 3, at 636. 
33 Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 415.   
34 See id. at 414-19 (reversing the lower court’s imposition of a compulsory 
license, which it equated to a forfeiture, and ordering an injunction against 
pending infringement suits). 
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restrain infringement of it by others.”35  On the other hand, the royalty-free 
compulsory license, which the Court equated with forfeiture, is inconsistent 
with a conceptualization of a patent as property: an appropriate remedy for 
antitrust violations is the “rearrangement of ownership, not [] its 
destruction.”36  Thus, a prospective remedy for antitrust violations might 
include the imposition of mandatory non-discriminatory licensing, at 
reasonable rates, while a potential defense for infringement of a patent used 
in an abusive manner would include unenforceability.37 
¶11 The doctrine of patent misuse—unenforceability of a patent as a 
penalty for its improper use—was firmly established in Morton Salt Co. v. 
G. S. Suppiger Co.38   (Morton Salt is also the source of the term “misuse of 
the patent.”39).  Morton Salt, the owner of a patent for a machine used for 
depositing salt tablets into canned food, sued a competitor for 
infringement.40  As a condition for licensing its patent, Morton Salt required 
licensees to use its unpatented salt tablets.41  The Supreme Court found this 
condition to be an attempt “to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly 
                                                     
35 Id. at 415. 
36 Id. at 416.  
37 This distinction between patent licensing practices as potential antitrust 
violations and patent misuse as a defense against patent infringement allegations 
is illustrated by Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 2937 (2005).  In Independent Ink, the 
patent owner was accused of violating the Sherman Act by requiring licensees of 
its patented printer technology to also purchase the necessary ink exclusively 
from the patent owner, i.e. “tying.”  Id. at 1345.  The primary issue on appeal 
was whether the mere possession of a patent creates a presumption of market 
power with respect to a tying product, or whether that market power must be 
affirmatively shown.  Id.  The Federal Circuit noted that patent tying is “an issue 
which may arise both in the context of affirmative claims (as here) and in the 
context of a patent misuse defense.”  Id. at 1346.  That these contexts are 
different, and are governed by different law, is demonstrated by the court’s 
footnote: “We note that tying as a defense in patent cases is governed by 
statute.”  Id. at 1346 n.3 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000)).  In fact, had the 
defendant patent owner’s tying practices been raised as a defense to patent 
infringement, the answer to the market power question would be clear: Section 
271(d)(5) of the patent code specifically requires that such market power be 
affirmatively demonstrated when tying is raised as an infringement defense.  35 
U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).   In contrast, in Independent Ink, the Federal Circuit found 
that in the context of a Sherman Act section 1 claim, market power arising from 
patent ownership need not be demonstrated, but could be presumed.  Indep. Ink, 
396 F.3d at 1344. 
38 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
39 Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in 
the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (2001). 
40 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 489. 
41 Id. at 491. 
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not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to 
grant.”42  The Court thus held that Morton Salt’s patent was unenforceable 
until Morton Salt corrected its improper licensing practices.43   
¶12 The Morton Salt Court declared that there was no need to engage in 
lengthy analysis of the relevant markets, anticompetitive impacts, and so on:  
The patentee, like . . . other holders of an exclusive privilege granted 
in the furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection of his 
grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert that policy.   
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the 
Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of the 
present suit to restrain petitioner's manufacture or sale of the alleged 
infringing machines is contrary to public policy . . . .44
In other words, where the patent holder is attempting to extend the reach of 
the patent monopoly, proof of anticompetitive effect is not required in order 
to render a patent unenforceable.45   
¶13 Courts in the 1960s and 1970s hewed to this per se rule of patent 
misuse, routinely refusing to enforce patents where extension of the 
monopoly-type abuse was demonstrated, without requiring evidence of 
anticompetitive effect.46  Against this backdrop, the Department of Justice 
                                                     
42 Id. at 492. 
43 See id. at 493 (“Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of 
the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at 
least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned 
and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”). 
44 Id. at 494.  See also Hoerner, supra note 39, at 670 (“There was no 
consideration of the proper description of the relevant market, Morton Salt’s 
share of it, the amount of salt tablets engrossed, or the effect of the restriction . . 
.”).  The Court thus reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which 
had criticized the district court’s failure to perform an analysis of the 
“monopolistic extent of [Morton Salt’s] contract.”  G.S. Suppiger v. Morton Salt 
Co., 117 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 1941), rev’d, 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
45 Hoerner, supra note 39, at 671.  Hoerner describes “two species” of patent 
misuse: “use of a patent to violate the antitrust law and so-called extension of 
the monopoly-type misuse.”  He cites Hartford-Empire as exemplifying the first 
type and Morton Salt as the progenitor of the second.  Id. at 669-70. 
46 See Hoerner, supra note 39, at 671-72 (citing as examples Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Berlenbach v. Anderson & 
Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1964); Key Pharms., Inc. v. Lowey, 
373 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. 
Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Dubuit v. Harwell Enters., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1184 
(W.D.N.C. 1971); Sonobond Corp. v. Uthe Tech., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970); and Columbus Auto. Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 264 F. Supp. 779 
(D. Colo. 1967)). 
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demonstrated a general hostility toward patent licensing, ultimately 
promulgating a list of licensing practices, known as the “Nine No-Nos,” that 
it presumed to be per se violations of the antitrust laws.47  Representing the 
Justice Department’s enforcement policy rather than statutory or judge-
made law, the Nine No-Nos were: 
1. Requiring a licensee to purchase unpatented materials 
from the licensor (tying). 
2. Requiring a licensee to assign to the licensor patents 
issued to the licensee after the licensing arrangement is 
executed. 
3. Restricting a purchaser of a patented product in the 
resale of that product. 
4. Restricting a licensee's freedom to deal in products or 
services outside the scope of the patent. 
5. Agreeing with a licensee that the licensor will not, 
without the licensee's consent, grant further licenses to 
any other person. 
6. Requiring that the licensee accept a “package” license. 
7. Requiring royalties not reasonably related to the 
licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent. 
8. Restricting the licensee’s sales of (unpatented) goods 
made with the licensed patented process. 
9. Requiring a licensee to adhere to specified or 
minimum prices in the sale of the licensed products.48 
The articulation of the Nine No-Nos represented the peak of skepticism 
towards patent licensing; patent holders were on notice that defiance of 
these rules was at their peril. 
                                                     
47 Carlson, supra note 3, at 375; Andewelt, supra note 3, at 620.  Andewelt 
asserts that the Justice Department “never made any significant headway in the 
courts with its novel approach to the patent/antitrust interface.”  Andewelt, 
supra note 3, at 620.   
48 Carlson, supra note 3, at 375 n.130 (citing Bruce B. Wilson, Remarks to 
Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and Patent, Trademark and Copyright 
Law Section (Sept. 21, 1972), reprinted in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,146, 
at 50,146); Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: 
Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 257, 260-61 n.23 
(1991).  
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C. The Recent Approach: The Demise of Per Se Patent Misuse 
¶14 Although an articulation of Justice Department antitrust policy 
rather than a restatement of the law of patent licensing, the Nine No-Nos 
nevertheless appeared to be consistent with the doctrine of patent misuse 
announced in Morton Salt.  Each rule (except perhaps the last) proscribes 
behavior that arguably constitutes an attempt to “extend” the patent 
monopoly.  Thus a violation of any of these rules, in addition to constituting 
antitrust violations, would presumably also qualify as patent misuse per se, 
thus rendering the subject patents unenforceable.  However, this official 
suspicion of patent licensing was quickly subsumed by criticism, some from 
within the Justice Department itself, which by the early 1980s was 
beginning to repudiate the Nine No-Nos approach.49 
¶15 Then, in 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
addressed patent misuse in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.50  
Windsurfing International (WSI) sought to enforce its patent, directed to a 
sailboard, against several alleged infringers, including AMF, Inc.51  In 
defense, AMF claimed that WSI had misused its patent, basing its claim on 
a provision included in patent license agreements between WSI and eleven 
licensees.52  This provision required that each licensee acknowledge the 
validity of WSI’s registered trademarks and refrain from using them.53 
¶16 Then-Chief Judge Markey briefly summarized the doctrine of 
patent misuse, and quickly reached his conclusion: 
The doctrine of patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a suit for 
patent infringement, and requires that the alleged infringer show that 
the patentee has impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal 
scope” of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect. . . . 
To sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing arrangement not 
held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a 
factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the license 
tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined 
relevant market.  [This] provision . . . cannot possibly restrain 
competition unlawfully . . . .54
 
                                                     
49 See Andewelt, supra note 3, at 620; Webb & Locke, supra note 48, at 262-64. 
50 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
51 Id. at 997. 
52 Id. at 1001. 
53 Id.  The trademarks included the terms WINDSURFER, WINDSURFING, and 
WIND SURF.  The district court had found all of these terms to be generic.  Id. 
54 Id. at 1001-02 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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In a footnote, Chief Judge Markey acknowledged changing views towards 
the patent misuse doctrine: “Recent economic analysis questions the 
rationale behind holding any licensing practice per se anticompetitive.”55  
This footnote perhaps explains why the Windsurfing definition of patent 
misuse differs significantly from the rule announced in Morton Salt. 
¶17 A key difference between the rule articulated in Windsurfing and 
the rule followed by earlier courts stems from three words strategically 
inserted into the Windsurfing rule: with anticompetitive effect.56  This 
requirement, that anticompetitive effect must be demonstrated, even in 
cases alleging “extension of the monopoly-type” patent misuse, was 
contrary to the approach followed by the courts in the two decades 
following Morton Salt.57  For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had stated: “[W]e find no merit in appellant’s contentions that the 
proof of substantial lessening of competition is a prerequisite to finding 
patent misuse.”58  The District of Colorado similarly stated: “A showing of 
an actual monopoly or a tendency to create such in a line of commerce is 
not necessary.”59 
¶18 In any event, skepticism towards patent licensing provisions was 
quickly replaced by skepticism towards the doctrine of patent misuse.  The 
Federal Circuit continued to apply its formulation of the doctrine to cases 
involving accusations of impermissible tying60 and patent exhaustion.61  
                                                     
55 Id. at 1001 n.9 (emphasis added).  Chief Judge Markey is presumably 
referring to the Chicago School of economic/legal analysis.  Cited in Markey’s 
footnote as critics of per se patent misuse are Judge Posner, of the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Roger B. Andewelt, Chief, Intellectual 
Property Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.  Id. 
56 Robert J. Hoerner points out that these three words are followed by a citation 
to Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 
(1971).  Hoerner, supra note 39, at 672-73.  However, as Hoerner notes, these 
words do not actually appear in the Blonder-Tongue opinion, which instead 
referred only to “the series of decisions in which the Court has condemned 
attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly.”  
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 343.  Hoerner thus argues that Windsurfing 
represents a very significant departure from Morton Salt.  See Hoerner, supra 
note 39, at 672-74. 
57 See Hoerner, supra note 39, at 671-72; supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
The examples following are provided by Hoerner, supra note 39, at 671-72. 
58 Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 
1964). 
59 Columbus Auto. Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 264 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D. Colo. 
1967), aff’d, 387 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1968). 
60 See Hoerner, supra note 39, at 679-80 (summarizing Virginia Panel Corp. v. 
MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  But see id. at 673-74 
(describing Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in 
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Congress weighed in, enacting the 1998 Patent Misuse Reform Act, which 
requires accused infringers who are asserting the defense of patent misuse 
under certain circumstances to demonstrate that the patent holder possesses 
market power in the relevant market.62  Finally, in 1995, the Justice 
Department, in cooperation with the Federal Trade Commission, released an 
updated version of federal antitrust enforcement policies with respect to 
patent licensing, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property (“1995 Guidelines”).63  The 1995 Guidelines extolled the pro-
competitive benefits of patent licensing and prescribed a cautious approach 
to antitrust scrutiny of patent license agreements, especially compared to the 
Nine No-Nos.64  These developments, signaling a clear decline of fortunes 
for the doctrine of patent misuse, set the stage for the Federal Circuit’s 
holding in Philips. 
II. MANDATORY “PACKAGE” LICENSING – PATENT MISUSE? 
¶19 Any discussion of the pro-competitive benefits of patent pooling 
includes the justification that pooling promotes the clearing of “blocking” 
patents.65  The 1995 Guidelines explain that one patent “‘blocks’ another 
when the second cannot be practiced without the first.”66  Since anyone that 
wishes to practice the combined invention requires access to both patents, 
pooling is an efficient way to promote exploitation of the invention.67 
¶20 But what if a group of patents is not mutually blocking?  Can a 
licensor require that a licensee purchase a license to a patent he does not 
necessarily need?  Until recently, such a requirement (a clear violation of 
the Nine No-Nos) was thought to be risky. 
                                                                                                                       
which the Federal Circuit did not require a finding of anticompetitive effect in a 
tying context). 
61 Id. at 675-79 (summarizing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), and B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
62 Pub. L. No. 100-173, 102 Stat. 4976 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(4)-
(5)).  As amended, §271(d) requires a showing of market power in cases 
alleging patent misuse based on a “refus[al] to license . . . or condition[ing of] 
the license of any rights to the patent . . . on the acquisition of a license to rights 
in another patent or purchase of a separate product . . . .”  35 U.S.C. §271(d)(4)-
(5) (2000). 
63 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23.  
64 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 376-78. 
65 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 379; 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 4-5; 
Andewelt, supra note 3, at 616. 
66 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 5. 
67 Id. 
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A. The 1995 Guidelines and the MPEG-2 Business Letter 
¶21 In the 1995 Guidelines, the Justice Department (along with the 
FTC) outlined its approach to analysis of patent pool arrangements.68  The 
1995 Guidelines emphasize the positive aspects of patent pools, noting that 
they “may provide pro-competitive benefits by integrating complementary 
technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and 
avoiding costly infringement litigation.”69  Only a few pooling practices are 
identified as potentially problematic: collective price or output restraints 
(unless they contribute to market efficiency); excluding competitors from 
access to the pooled patents (but only when the pool members collectively 
possess market power and the excluded member is therefore unable to 
compete); and restrictions that negatively impact research and 
development.70  On the other hand, some practices that might “otherwise 
[be] prohibited, such as joint setting of royalty rates and package licensing,” 
are permissible when the involved patents are blocking.71 
¶22 Absent from the 1995 Guidelines is any mention of the Nine No-
Nos as such.  Instead, the guidelines advocate that most licensing 
agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason, requiring an 
examination of the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.72  Nonetheless, 
a few practices are acknowledged as “unlawful per se, without an elaborate 
inquiry into the restraint’s likely competitive effect,” including “naked 
price-fixing, output restraints, and market division among horizontal 
competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and resale price 
maintenance.”73 
¶23 Seeking to avoid potential problems, several pools have requested 
“business review letters” from the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice.74  A leading example is the letter provided to MPEG LA, L.L.C (the 
                                                     
68 Id. at 27-30. 
69 Id. at 28. 
70 Id. at 28-29; Carlson, supra note 3, at 377-78. 
71 Carlson, supra note 3, at 378; 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 29-30 ex.10. 
72 See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 16. 
73 Id. 
74 Examples are MPEG LA, see Letter from Joel Klein, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., of  Sullivan & Cromwell (June 
26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.pdf 
[hereinafter MPEG Business Review Letter]; Toshiba Corporation and other 
owners of DVD-related patents, see Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney 
General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 
(June 10, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf; and 3G Patent Platform 
Partnership, see Letter from Charles James, Assistant Attorney General, to Ky P. 
Ewing, Esq., of Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. (Nov. 12, 2002), available at 
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“MPEG Business Review Letter”), a company created to pool the rights to 
patents essential to a number of standards related to video and audio 
compression, including the MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 protocols.75 
¶24 Several of the Nine No-Nos are explicitly addressed in the MPEG 
Business Review Letter.  For example, the letter notes that the MPEG LA 
agreement “imposes no obligation on the licensee to use only the licensed 
patents and leaves the licensee free independently to develop ‘competitive 
video products . . . .’”76  In addition, although the MPEG LA agreement, 
constitutes a “package” license, this packaging is not mandatory, as “each 
Portfolio patent is also available for licensing independently from” its 
owner.77  Finally, the letter notes approvingly that the proposed agreement 
conditions “licensee royalty liability on actual use of the Portfolio 
patents.”78 
¶25 The MPEG Business Review Letter stresses in particular the 
“essentiality” of the patents in the portfolio:  “The limitation of the Portfolio 
to technically essential patents . . . reduces the risk that the Portfolio will be 
used to eliminate rivalry between potentially competing technologies.”79  
This emphasis demonstrates continued concern about a patent pool’s 
potentially anticompetitive effects, but reflects an understanding that no 
harm is done so long as “the prospective licensee is being compelled to 
accept no more than he would, in any event, have to obtain in order to make 
worthwhile a license under any of the patents.”80  Here, essential carries a 
similar meaning to blocking; thus, the MPEG Business Review Letter’s 
emphasis on essentiality mirrors the 1995 Guidelines recognition that a 
patent pool is most likely to provide pro-competitive benefits if it includes 
only blocking patents.81 
B.  Philips and Mandatory Package Licensing 
¶26 In U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the 
Federal Circuit was faced squarely with the question whether a mandatory 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.pdf.  The Justice 
Department’s business review procedure is codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.6. 
75 See MPEG Business Review Letter, supra note 74, at 1.  See also MPEG LA, 
MPEG-4 Visual, http://www.mpegla.com/m4v/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2005); 
MPEG LA, MPEG-2, http://www.mpegla.com/m2/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).   
76 MPEG Business Review Letter, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting the Patent 
Portfolio License submitted by MPEG LA). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 16. 
79 Id. 
80 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 389 (quoting Int’l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 
723 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
81 See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 23, at 5. 
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package license that included at least one non-essential patent constituted 
patent misuse.82  In an earlier proceeding, the Commission had declared six 
patents owned by Philips unenforceable on the grounds that Philips’ 
licensing program constituted per se patent misuse, as well as misuse under 
the rule of reason.83 
1. The Philips patent pool was not per se patent misuse. 
¶27 The Federal Circuit thoroughly dismantled the Commission’s 
opinion in reversing the holding of unenforceability and remanding the case 
for further proceedings.  First, the court rejected the Commission’s 
conclusion that mandatory package licensing constitutes per se misuse.  
Accepting that Philips required licensees to accept the licenses as a 
package,84 the court disagreed with the Commission that “finding patent 
misuse based on a tying arrangement between patents . . . is a reasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent.”85  Instead, the court explained, 
the cases cited by the Commission were “more akin” to tying between a 
patent and a product, not tying between two patents.86 
¶28 In any event, the court pointed out, the Philips licensing 
arrangement did not force a licensee to actually use the non-essential 
patents.87 In addition, there was no evidence that any portion of the royalty 
charged by Philips was directly attributable to the non-essential patents.88  
In the courts view, then, the Philips licensing scheme was easily 
distinguishable from product tying, known to be per se patent misuse, 
                                                     
82 U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
83 Id. at 1184; Int’l Trade Comm’n, Commission Opinion, In re Certain 
Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, 
at 63 (served Apr. 8, 2004) (public version) [hereinafter Commission Opinion]. 
84 Philips, 424 F.3d at 1182. 
85 Id. at 1187 (quoting  Commission Opinion, supra note 83, at 13). 
86 Id. at 1188.  The Commission had relied on two cases in which the Supreme 
Court had “condemned the practice of ‘block-booking’ movies,” i.e. requiring 
theater owners to accept (and display) movies that they did not want in order to 
get access to those they did.  Id.  at 1187.  In one of these cases, United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down the block-booking 
practice by analogizing the practice to earlier cases involving license agreements 
conditioning a patent license on the purchase of unpatented products.  334 U.S. 
131 (1948).  The Commission read that condemnation broadly, asserting that 
“the Supreme Court has held the practice of mandatory package licensing of 
intellectual property illegal per se.”  Commission Opinion, supra note 83, at 13. 
87 Philips, 424 F.3d at 1188. 
88 Id. at 1189. 
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“because of the fundamental difference between an obligation to purchase a 
product and the extension of a nonexclusive license to practice a patent.”89 
¶29 The court pointed out that nothing prevented Philips from licensing 
only its essential patents as a package—at the same royalty rate that it was 
currently charging—and offering the non-essential patents for free.90  
Indeed, the Commission’s rule, the court asserted,  
[W]ould have the perverse effect of potentially putting a party owning 
both an essential patent and a nonessential but related patent in a worse 
position than a party owning only the essential patent.  The party 
owning only the essential patent would be free to charge any licensing 
fee up to the maximum that a manufacturer would be willing to pay to 
practice the patented technology, while a party owning both the 
essential patent and a nonessential patent would be barred from 
extracting that maximum licensing fee for its essential patent and 
assuring the manufacturer that it would not be subject to suit on the 
nonessential patent.91
 
On its face, this reasoning would seem to obviate any requirement that 
future patent licensors segregate nonessential patents from a pooling 
arrangement.  In a single stroke, the Federal Circuit has discarded a major 
premise underlying the 1995 Guidelines.92
2. The Philips patent pool was not patent misuse under the rule of reason. 
¶30 Turning its attention to analysis of the Philips licenses under the 
rule of reason, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Commission’s 
approach “was predicated on legal errors and factual findings that were not 
supported by substantial evidence.”93  “Most importantly,” the court said, 
“[the Commission’s] conclusion was largely predicated on the 
anticompetitive effect on competitors offering alternatives to the four so-
called nonessential patents in the Philips patent packages.”94  Even had such 
an effect actually been proven—the court concluded that it had not—the 
Commission should have proceeded to balance that effect against the 
“efficiencies that package licensing may produce,” especially in light of the 
transaction costs associated with multiple individuated licenses.95 
                                                     
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1190-91. 
91 Id. at 1192 n.5. 
92 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
93 Philips, 424 F.3d at 1198. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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¶31 The court acknowledged that the Commission had found that an 
alternative technology to two of the non-essential patents existed.96  
However, the court concluded that the evidence failed to demonstrate that 
this technology “was an alternative that Philips’s licensees wished to use in 
place of the technology covered by the [non-essential] patents.”97  
Accordingly, since no actual anticompetitive effect was demonstrated, there 
could be no patent misuse under the rule of reason. 
C. A (Brief) Critique of the Federal Circuit’s Economic Analysis 
¶32 The Federal Circuit claims that the Commission’s decision 
(condemning the inclusion of a non-essential patent in a mandatory package 
license) would effectively place a person with both essential and 
nonessential patents in a worse financial position than a person with only 
essential patents.98  If true, this would be damning criticism.  But is the 
court correct?   
¶33 The court’s reasoning seems to be based on the premise that only a 
certain amount of funds are available from a potential licensee for 
purchasing patent licenses.  Since the licensor has a blocking patent, he 
should be able to extract all of those funds from the licensee.99  The court 
reads the Commission’s opinion as implying a requirement that a patent 
owner owning an essential patent as well as a related non-essential patent 
must price the non-essential patent separately.100  Since the licensee only 
has a fixed amount to spend, the court suggests that the first patentee, 
owning only the essential patent, is able to demand the licensee’s entire 
budget, while the second patentee, forced to offer two separately-priced 
licenses, might end up with less than the entire budget, if the licensee 
chooses to decline the offer of the non-essential patent. 
¶34 The court is correct.  In the second situation, the patentee might 
indeed receive less from the licensee.  However, the court fails to realize 
that it is comparing two different market situations.  If the so-called non-
essential patent has any value at all, then it is competing in a separate (albeit 
closely related) technology market.  If the licensee is participating in both 
markets (i.e. he has a need for both technologies) then he must necessarily 
                                                     
96 Id. at 1195. 
97 Id.   
98 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
99 See Philips, 424 F.3d at 1192 n.5 (“The party owning only the essential patent 
would be free to charge any licensing fee up to the maximum that a 
manufacturer would be willing to pay to practice the patented technology . . . .”). 
100 See id. (“[A] party owning both the essential patent and a nonessential patent 
would be barred from extracting that maximum licensing fee for its essential 
patent and assuring the manufacturer that it would not be subject to suit on the 
nonessential patent.”). 
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allocate his budget between the two.  The Commission’s rule, that a patent 
owner must not tie these two markets together by means of a single, 
mandatory package license, does not make the patent owner worse off.  
Rather, the particular market situation, where the licensee has a fixed 
budget to allocate between two distinct purchases, makes the patent owner 
(potentially) worse off. 
¶35 As an illustration, assume that licensee A desires access to patent X.  
The technology enabled by patent X has a maximum value of one dollar to 
the licensee; either the technology adds one dollar’s worth of commercial 
value to the end user, or the technology shaves one dollar from A’s 
manufacturing costs.  P is the owner of patent X; with perfect information 
about A’s needs and excellent negotiation skills, P might win the entire 
dollar from A in return for a license. 
¶36 Next, assume that licensee B also needs access to patent X.  
However, in order to make any use at all of the technology enabled by 
patent X, B must also have access to either patent Y or patent Z.  In 
addition, assume that licensee B values either of these combinations (X with 
Y or X with Z) at one dollar.  Finally, P, the owner of technology X, also 
owns technology Y.  However, a third party, Q, owns technology Z. 
¶37 The preceding describes two scenarios like those mentioned by the 
court in Philips.  In the first scenario, P can potentially capture licensee A’s 
entire budget.  In the second scenario, P can only capture that entire budget 
if he packages X and Y together.  Since the licensee must have either X 
with Y or X with Z, and is only offered X with Y, licensee B’s choice is 
clear.  On the other hand, if P is forced to offer X and Y separately, then Q 
can compete with P.  In some cases, licensee B might select Z over Y; then 
the amount P collects for technology X depends on how much of B’s budget 
was spent on technology Z.101 
¶38 Patent owner P is clearly in a worse position in the second scenario 
described above, if the law requires him to license his technology 
separately.  However, this is not a perverse consequence of an arbitrary rule.  
                                                     
101 Of course, P could choose to dedicate technology Y to the public domain.  
See Philips, 424 F.3d at 1192 (suggesting that a patentee in this situation could 
surrender the nonessential patent or announce a policy of nonenforcement).  
Doing so might very well foreclose the possibility that patent Z’s owner is 
unable to collect any licensing revenues.  However, this would only be rational 
if patent Y offered no technical or commercial advantage at all over patent Z; 
otherwise P should be able to claim at least part of the value Y offers relative to 
Z.  For example, if patent Y allows a cost savings of $0.10 in the manufacturing, 
while Z only contributes $0.05, P should be able to claim at least a portion of the 
$0.05 value created by his patent.  One might argue that it makes no sense for 
the law to be overly concerned with protecting inferior technology. 
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Rather, this is a consequence of a completely different market scenario.  
Indeed, this illustration demonstrates precisely the issue of concern:  if 
patent owner P is allowed to bundle his patents together, he is able to use 
his blocking position with technology X to completely foreclose 
competition between technologies Y and Z.102  This would appear to be the 
epitome of extension of the monopoly-type patent misuse.103 
CONCLUSION 
¶39 Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit’s economic analysis 
stands up to scrutiny, a few things are apparent in the wake of Philips.  
First, per se patent misuse appears destined to be only of historical 
interest.104  Unless a patent licensing practice is directly analogous to the 
few practices explicitly deemed illegal by the Supreme Court, lower courts 
following Philips are unlikely to find per se patent misuse merely because a 
licensing practice can be construed to “extend” the patent monopoly.  
Rather, accused infringers raising the defense of patent misuse must 
demonstrate actual anticompetitive effects stemming from the patentee’s 
licensing practices.   
¶40 Second, and perhaps more significantly for today’s practitioner, 
Philips suggests that patent pool administrators need not be as concerned as 
they were in the past about excluding non-essential patents from package 
licensing arrangements, despite the decades-long assumption that patent 
pools could only be justified by their beneficial clearing of blocking patents.  
While Philips should not be read to broadly approve of the intentional 
inclusion of non-essential patents in portfolios offered only as a package, 
the case is nonetheless likely to be widely cited as a defense, at least for an 
accidental or incidental inclusion of such patents.105  Unless a challenger 
can show not only that alternatives to the non-essential patent exist, but that 
                                                     
102 Cf. Commission Opinion, supra note 83, at 61 (describing administrative law 
judge’s conclusion that inclusion of a non-essential patent in the Philips patent 
portfolio “unreasonably foreclosed competition”). 
103 See supra note 45. 
104 Cf. Hoerner, supra note 39, at 683 (suggesting, pre-Philips, that “the Federal 
Circuit appears to have abolished extension of the monopoly-type misuse 
altogether”). 
105 Accidental or incidental inclusion of a non-essential patent in a patent pool 
might be quite likely, despite the best efforts of an administrator to admit only 
essential patents.  This may be especially true when the technology is rapidly 
evolving.  See Philips, 424 F.3d at 1198 (“[C]hanges in the technology . . . could 
render some patents that were indisputably essential at the time of licensing 
arguably nonessential at some later point in the life of the license.”). 
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licensees were actually deterred from using those alternatives, such an 
inclusion is unlikely to provide a basis for patent misuse.106 
¶41 For today’s accused infringer, asserting patent misuse as a defense 
is likely to result in a harrowing experience.   
                                                     
106 See id. (“There was no evidence before the Commission that any 
manufacturer had actually refused to consider alternatives to the technology 
covered by those patents.”). 
